![]() Pouthas, “La politique de Thiers pendant la crise orientale de 1840,” Revue historique, 182 (1938), 72–96īesides Ingram, Great Game in Asia, see G. Webb, “Sea Power in the Ochakov Affair of 1791,” International History Review, 2 (1980), 13–33.īesides Webster and Bourne on Palmerston’s policy (n. 1, The Tears of Acclaim (New York, 1969) Paul L. Elrod, “The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System,” World Politics, 28 (1976), 159–74.įor an example of such rationalization, see Michael Sheehan, “The Place of the Balancer in Balance of Power Theory,” Review of International Studies, 15 (1989), 123–34. See, for example, Carsten Holbraad, The Concert of Europe: A Study in German and British International Theory 1815–1914 (London, 1970) Richard B. Moul, “Measuring the ‘Balances of Power’: A Look at Some Numbers,” Review of International Studies, 15 (1989), 101–21 David Singer and Melvin Small, and others, have encountered grave conceptual and methodological problems- e.g., how to quantify and weigh the impact of such factors as industry, natural resources, level of education, technological advancement, and national unity and morale on state power. Various efforts to measure power and power relationships quantitatively undertaken by political scientists, including such distinguished scholars as Robert North, Richard Rosecrance, A. Szabo, “Prince Kaunitz and the Balance of Power,” International History Review, 1 (1979), 399–408. Schroeder, “The Nineteenth Century System: Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium?” Review of International Studies, 15 (1989), 136–37.įrank A. Haas, “The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda,” World Politics, 5 (1953), 442–77 Richard Little, “Deconstructing the Balance of Power: Two Traditions of Thought,” Review of Lnternational Studies, 15 (1989), 87–100Į. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace (Cambridge, 1963) and Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (New York, 1977). Both Gulick’s and Kissinger’s works employ it, as does F. What else were the statesmen at Vienna doing if not restoring a balance of power in Europe by redistributing territories and peoples? What can account for international peace and stability after 1815 if not that the European balance of power was restored after a generation of French revolutionary expansion and Napoleonic imperialism, this time supported and strengthened through a system of alliances, treaty guarantees, and Concert diplomacy? ![]() 2 Not only did their language seem to make the balance of power a vital goal and working principle of the settlement but so did their conduct and the outcome of their efforts. ![]() 1 Irrefutable evidence seems to come directly from the peacemakers at Vienna themselves in everything from official treaties to private letters and diaries, they spoke of peace and stability in terms of a proper balance (“juste équilibre”) achieved by a redistribution of forces (“répartition des forces”), or in similar balance of power phrases. However much historians have differed in interpreting various aspects of the Vienna settlement and the nineteenth century international system founded upon it, they have never doubted that these included a balance of power as an essential ingredient. The question posed by the title of this essay must appear a bit unreal.
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